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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Appellant challenges the District Court’s order granting in part and denying in part 
her motion for summary judgment against Appellee and granting in part and denying in 
part Appellee’s motion for summary judgment against Appellant.  Because the only issue 
raised on appeal was not raised below, we conclude that it has been waived and will 
affirm the District Court’s order. 
I.1 
A. 
 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”) requires that every 
child with a disability receive a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”), 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A), which is defined as “special education and related services that,” among 
other things, “have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge,” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A).  To ensure that a FAPE is 
provided to all disabled children, the IDEA provides that federal funding be distributed to 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the procedural 
posture to date, we only include what is necessary to explain our decision. 
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State educational agencies (“SEAs”), which, in turn, allocate those funds to local 
educational agencies (“LEAs”).  See 20 U.S.C. § 1411. 
 LEAs are charged with directly providing or arranging for third-party provision of 
a FAPE, see, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1414; however, SEAs “retain[] primary responsibility for 
ensuring compliance with the IDEA and for administering educational programs for 
disabled children,” M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 344 F.3d 
335, 340 (3d Cir. 2003); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(A) (holding the SEA 
“responsible for ensuring that . . . the requirements of [the IDEA] are met” and “all 
educational programs . . . meet the educational standards of the [SEA]”).  When an LEA 
“is unable to establish and maintain programs of free appropriate public education that 
meet the requirements of [the IDEA],” the SEA is required to “use the payments that 
would otherwise have been available to a local educational agency or to a State agency to 
provide special education and related services directly to children with disabilities.”  20 
U.S.C. § 1413(g)(1). 
 Anticipating that disagreements will sometimes arise between parents or guardians 
of children with disabilities and their LEAs, the IDEA requires that SEAs establish 
specific procedural safeguards to facilitate resolution.  See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415.  
For example, SEAs must afford parents and guardians the opportunity to file a due 
process complaint, § 1415(b)(7), and, where such a complaint is filed, provide an 
impartial due process hearing, § 1415(f)(1)(A).  Before a hearing occurs, however, the 
IDEA mandates that the two parties meet to attempt to resolve the complaint.  
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i).  Where such a meeting is successful, the IDEA directs the parties to 
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“execute a legally binding agreement that is . . . enforceable in any State court of 
competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States” (a “resolution 
agreement”).  § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii). 
B. 
 T.T. was identified as a child with a specific learning disability, Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder, and Oppositional Defiant Disorder, and, therefore, must be 
provided with a FAPE pursuant to the IDEA.  LeJeune G., T.T.’s guardian, filed a due 
process complaint against T.T.’s LEA, Khepera Charter School, alleging that Khepera 
denied him a FAPE from 2013 to 2015.  The officer who presided over the due process 
hearing agreed and ordered Khepera to provide compensatory education to T.T.  Khepera 
and LeJeune G. eventually entered into an agreement implementing the hearing officer’s 
decision (the “Implementation Agreement”). 
  The following year, LeJeune G. filed a second due process complaint against 
Khepera pursuing additional compensatory education and funding for T.T. to attend the 
Y.A.L.E. School (“Y.A.L.E.”), a local private school for children with disabilities.  
Pursuant to the IDEA’s required resolution mechanism, LeJeune G. and Khepera 
attempted to resolve the complaint prior to a due process hearing and, upon successful 
negotiation, executed a resolution agreement (the “Resolution Agreement”) in which 
Khepera agreed to, among other things, pay for T.T. to attend Y.A.L.E. for the seventh 
grade. 
 T.T. attended Y.A.L.E. and, by all accounts, was provided with an appropriate 
education, but Khepera failed to pay all of his tuition.  Although she has neither paid nor 
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been asked to pay any of the balance owed to Y.A.L.E., LeJeune G. sought direct 
payment to Y.A.L.E. from both Khepera and Pennsylvania’s SEA, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education (“PDE”); however, Khepera was and continues to be financially 
insolvent, and PDE refused her request.  T.T. attended Y.A.L.E. through the eighth grade 
but was barred from returning afterwards because his tuition remained partially unpaid 
for both years. 
 LeJeune G. initiated this action against Khepera, PDE, and its Secretary, alleging 
in her complaint that Khepera breached both the Implementation Agreement and the 
Resolution Agreement.  With regard to the latter breach, she specifically claimed that 
Khepera failed to pay T.T.’s Y.A.L.E. tuition in full and still owes $44,519.08 to the 
private school.  She argued that these breaches amount to a violation of the IDEA and 
that, because Khepera is “unwilling or unable” to fulfill its obligations under the IDEA, 
“PDE is responsible for remedying T.T.’s denial of [a] FAPE, including honoring all of 
the terms of the Due Process Order as interpreted by the T.T. Implementation Agreement 
and the T.T. Resolution Agreement.”  JA 31.  This is the only allegation regarding PDE’s 
liability. 
 LeJeune G. moved for summary judgment against both Khepera and PDE for 
compensatory education funds and payment of T.T.’s Y.A.L.E. tuition.  PDE filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment contending that it has no liability.  With regard to 
that issue, LeJeune G. argued that when a charter school acting as an LEA cannot or will 
not fulfill its obligations under a resolution agreement, the SEA “is required to step into 
[the LEA]’s shoes” and fulfill any unmet terms of the agreement.  JA 138.  In its motion, 
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PDE argued that, under such circumstances, an SEA has no duty to fulfill outstanding 
obligations and, instead, must only provide relief to the extent it believes necessary to 
provide the child with a FAPE. 
 The District Court granted LeJeune G.’s motion against Khepera in full and 
against PDE on her compensatory education claim, but it denied her motion against PDE 
on her claim for tuition payment to Y.A.L.E.  The Court denied PDE’s motion on its 
liability for compensatory education funds but granted it on its obligation to pay the 
balance of T.T.’s Y.A.L.E. tuition.  In doing so, the Court first recognized that this Court 
has held that “an SEA is ultimately responsible for providing children with a FAPE.”  JA 
139; see Kruelle v. New Castle Cty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 696 (3d Cir. 1981).  And, in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, courts have generally held that an SEA can be held 
responsible for an LEA’s refusal or inability to provide a child with a FAPE where “the 
school was closed or defunct.”  JA 140–41 (citations omitted). 
 Although Khepera was not closed or defunct, the District Court determined that it 
was nonetheless “unable” to satisfy its obligations under the IDEA, and, therefore, PDE 
was “required to step in to the breach.”  JA 143–44.  The District Court reasoned, 
however, that “T.T.’s claim against PDE for reimbursement . . . turn[ed] on whether T.T. 
will be denied a FAPE if PDE does not step in to the breach.”  JA 146. 
 The District Court ultimately concluded that “T.T. will not be denied a FAPE if 
PDE does not reimburse YALE,” so PDE was not liable for T.T.’s unpaid tuition.  JA 
146–47.  The Court reasoned that (1) the resolution agreement explicitly stated that 
education at Y.A.L.E. was not “necessary” to provide T.T. with a FAPE, (2) LeJeune G. 
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agreed that she would notify Khepera if she did not believe that the arrangement was 
providing T.T. with a FAPE, and (3) “T.T. was not withdrawn, disenrolled, or otherwise 
removed from YALE as a result of Khepera’s nonpayment.”  JA 146.  The Court also 
acknowledged that “several courts have held that a direct payment remedy for retroactive 
tuition may be appropriate in certain situations,” but those cases “involved an appeal of 
a[n] administrative proceeding” and “[u]nlike here, each of those cases alleged that a 
student was denied a FAPE.”   JA 147.  LeJeune G. filed this timely appeal. 
II.2  
 On appeal, Appellant does not rely on the Due Process Award, or the breach of the 
Implementation Agreement or the Resolution Agreement.  Rather, she claims that since 
the statutory definition of FAPE includes the requirement that an education be “provided 
at public expense,” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A), PDE must pay Y.A.L.E. in order to provide a 
FAPE. 
 This claim was never asserted in her complaint in the District Court.3  Appellant 
would have us determine, in the first instance, whether the existence of this statutory 
provision permits a cause of action by a parent or guardian against the state any time an 
entity may not have been fully paid for the benefit provided to a student.  This presents a 
                                              
2 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  This 
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s summary 
judgment order de novo.  Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 
2018). 
3 The District Court did mention “the text of the statute” in referring to the claim against 
PDE, see JA 147, but we think it was based on the allegation that PDE had to remedy 
Khepera’s breach, not that “public expense,” in and of itself, created a cause of action. 
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host of issues that were never addressed in the District Court and that were never 
presented in a way that the District Court could have anticipated them. 
 PDE asserts that the precise issue before us was waived as not raised in the 
District Court.  On the one hand, “[i]t is well established that arguments not raised before 
the District Court are waived on appeal.”  Garza v. Citigroup Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 284 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  In Spireas v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, we held that “merely raising an issue that encompasses the appellate 
argument is not enough,” and “[w]hether an argument remains fair game on appeal is 
determined by the ‘degree of particularity’ with which it was raised in the trial court, and 
parties must do so with ‘exacting specificity.’”  886 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 However, “this rule is one of discretion rather than jurisdiction.”  Barefoot 
Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 834–35 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We have considered arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal in “exceptional circumstances,” including where public interest would be served 
by consideration of the issue; where an argument is “closely related” to the arguments 
raised below; and where the purposes of waiver, including the judicial interests that it 
serves, would not be furthered by its application.  Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 
406, 416–17 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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 Appellant concedes that she did not preserve her argument under Spireas.4  
However, she urges that the circumstances of this case are exceptional and asks us to 
exercise our discretion and consider the merits of her argument.  We decline to do so.  
The concept of “public expense” implicates several issues of fact and law not developed 
below.  See Sharp, 638 F.3d at 417 (“The waiver rule applies with greatest force where 
the timely raising of the issue would have permitted the parties to develop a factual 
record.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  First, is the requirement of 
provision “at public expense” a requirement separate from “without charge”?  Second, 
does it impose on PDE an independent obligation to pay even if the parent has borne no 
financial burden and the child has received the education?  Third, Appellant asserts that 
she is harmed because Y.A.L.E. will not reenroll T.T. unless the owed tuition is paid.  
But do we know if Y.A.L.E. will readmit T.T. if it is paid?  (i.e., does she have standing, 
is non-payment the cause of her injury, and is the injury redressable?)  Lastly, what does 
PDE have to do to satisfy the public expense requirement?  If it paid Khepera for T.T.’s 
seventh grade education but Khepera failed to transfer the funds to Y.A.L.E., does PDE 
still have an obligation to pay Y.A.L.E.?5  Nowhere were these questions that are implicit 
in the current argument made by LeJeune G. presented in the context of the litigation 
                                              
4 Alternatively, she contends that we should rely on the Supreme Court’s more liberal 
standard, espoused in Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1992), but Yee is 
not a case about waiver.  It considers whether to address, as part of a petition for 
certiorari, arguments not addressed below.  Tellingly, it cautions against considering an 
argument such as the one before us:  “Prudence . . . dictates awaiting a case in which the 
issue was fully litigated below, so that we will have the benefit of developed arguments 
on both sides and lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.”  Id. at 538. 
5 At oral argument, Appellant urged that the answer to this question is “yes.” 
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before the District Court.  Thus, the sole argument presented on appeal has been waived, 
and we will not disturb the judgment of the District Court. 
III. 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting in part 
and denying in part Appellant’s motion for summary judgment against Appellee and 
granting in part and denying in part Appellee’s motion for summary judgment against 
Appellant. 
